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refactor: use the term unmount instead of dismount (#1478)

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* refactor: use UNMOUNT instead of DISMOUNT in code

This change updates the term DISMOUNT in constants to UNMOUNT.
Other occurrences (e.g. variable names) are left alone for now.

* refactor(ui): use unmount instead of dismount

This change updates the GUI text and replaces dismount with unmount.

* docs: update term dismount -> unmount

* refactor(cmdline): add unmount

This change adds an argument 'unmount' for command line usage, while
trying to deprecate the old disnount argument.
The current dismount argument/flag will still work to not introduce
a breaking change.

* docs: mention that /dismount is deprecated

This change fixes the shorthand version of the argument /unmount
It also adds back the info for /dismount and that it is deprecated.
This commit is contained in:
Helmut K. C. Tessarek
2025-01-31 23:18:26 +01:00
committed by GitHub
parent c71fa14dc0
commit 498dff9013
99 changed files with 2014 additions and 2006 deletions
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10
doc/html/Protection of Hidden Volumes.html
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@@ -61,12 +61,12 @@ OK</em>.</div>
<br style="text-align:left">
Both passwords must be correct; otherwise, the outer volume will not be mounted. When hidden volume protection is enabled, VeraCrypt does
<em style="text-align:left">not</em> actually mount the hidden volume. It only decrypts its header (in RAM) and retrieves information about the size of the hidden volume (from the decrypted header). Then, the outer volume is mounted and any attempt to save
data to the area of the hidden volume will be rejected (until the outer volume is dismounted).
<strong style="text-align:left">Note that VeraCrypt never modifies the filesystem (e.g., information about allocated clusters, amount of free space, etc.) within the outer volume in any way. As soon as the volume is dismounted, the protection is lost. When
data to the area of the hidden volume will be rejected (until the outer volume is unmounted).
<strong style="text-align:left">Note that VeraCrypt never modifies the filesystem (e.g., information about allocated clusters, amount of free space, etc.) within the outer volume in any way. As soon as the volume is unmounted, the protection is lost. When
the volume is mounted again, it is not possible to determine whether the volume has used hidden volume protection or not. The hidden volume protection can be activated only by users who supply the correct password (and/or keyfiles) for the hidden volume (each
time they mount the outer volume). <br style="text-align:left">
</strong><br style="text-align:left">
As soon as a write operation to the hidden volume area is denied/prevented (to protect the hidden volume), the entire host volume (both the outer and the hidden volume) becomes write-protected until dismounted (the VeraCrypt driver reports the 'invalid parameter'
As soon as a write operation to the hidden volume area is denied/prevented (to protect the hidden volume), the entire host volume (both the outer and the hidden volume) becomes write-protected until unmounted (the VeraCrypt driver reports the 'invalid parameter'
error to the system upon each attempt to write data to the volume). This preserves plausible deniability (otherwise certain kinds of inconsistency within the file system could indicate that this volume has used hidden volume protection). When damage to hidden
volume is prevented, a warning is displayed (provided that the VeraCrypt Background Task is enabled &ndash; see the chapter
<a href="VeraCrypt%20Background%20Task.html" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none.html">
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ Moreover, the field <em style="text-align:left">Hidden Volume Protected </em>in
'<em style="text-align:left">Yes (damage prevented!)</em>'<em style="text-align:left">.</em><br style="text-align:left">
<br style="text-align:left">
Note that when damage to hidden volume is prevented, <em style="text-align:left">
no</em> information about the event is written to the volume. When the outer volume is dismounted and mounted again, the volume properties will
no</em> information about the event is written to the volume. When the outer volume is unmounted and mounted again, the volume properties will
<em style="text-align:left">not </em>display the string &quot;<em style="text-align:left">damage prevented</em>&quot;.<em style="text-align:left"><br style="text-align:left">
</em></div>
<div style="text-align:left; margin-top:19px; margin-bottom:19px; padding-top:0px; padding-bottom:0px">
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ The type of the mounted outer volume is <em style="text-align:left">Outer</em>:
<strong style="text-align:left">Important: You are the only person who can mount your outer volume with the hidden volume protection enabled (since nobody else knows your hidden volume password). When an adversary asks you to mount an outer volume, you of course
must </strong></em><strong style="text-align:left">not</strong><em style="text-align:left"><strong style="text-align:left"> mount it with the hidden volume protection enabled. You must mount it as a normal volume (and then VeraCrypt will not show the volume
type &quot;Outer&quot; but &quot;Normal&quot;). The reason is that, during the time when an outer volume is mounted with the hidden volume protection enabled, the adversary
</strong></em><strong style="text-align:left">can</strong><em style="text-align:left"><strong style="text-align:left"> find out that a hidden volume exists within the outer volume (he/she will be able to find it out until the volume is dismounted and possibly
</strong></em><strong style="text-align:left">can</strong><em style="text-align:left"><strong style="text-align:left"> find out that a hidden volume exists within the outer volume (he/she will be able to find it out until the volume is unmounted and possibly
even some time after the computer has been powered off - see <a href="Unencrypted%20Data%20in%20RAM.html" style="text-align:left; color:#0080c0; text-decoration:none.html">
Unencrypted Data in RAM</a>).</strong></em> <br style="text-align:left">
<br style="text-align:left">