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https://github.com/veracrypt/VeraCrypt.git
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Add original TrueCrypt 7.1a sources
This commit is contained in:
Mounir IDRASSI
422
src/Common/Password.c
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422
src/Common/Password.c
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/*
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Legal Notice: Some portions of the source code contained in this file were
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derived from the source code of Encryption for the Masses 2.02a, which is
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Copyright (c) 1998-2000 Paul Le Roux and which is governed by the 'License
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Agreement for Encryption for the Masses'. Modifications and additions to
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the original source code (contained in this file) and all other portions
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of this file are Copyright (c) 2003-2010 TrueCrypt Developers Association
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and are governed by the TrueCrypt License 3.0 the full text of which is
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contained in the file License.txt included in TrueCrypt binary and source
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code distribution packages. */
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#include "Tcdefs.h"
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#include "Crypto.h"
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#include "Volumes.h"
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#include "Password.h"
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#include "Dlgcode.h"
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#include "Language.h"
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#include "Pkcs5.h"
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#include "Endian.h"
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#include "Random.h"
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#include <io.h>
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void VerifyPasswordAndUpdate (HWND hwndDlg, HWND hButton, HWND hPassword,
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HWND hVerify, unsigned char *szPassword,
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char *szVerify,
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BOOL keyFilesEnabled)
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{
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char szTmp1[MAX_PASSWORD + 1];
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char szTmp2[MAX_PASSWORD + 1];
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int k = GetWindowTextLength (hPassword);
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BOOL bEnable = FALSE;
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if (hwndDlg); /* Remove warning */
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GetWindowText (hPassword, szTmp1, sizeof (szTmp1));
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GetWindowText (hVerify, szTmp2, sizeof (szTmp2));
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if (strcmp (szTmp1, szTmp2) != 0)
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bEnable = FALSE;
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else
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{
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if (k >= MIN_PASSWORD || keyFilesEnabled)
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bEnable = TRUE;
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else
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bEnable = FALSE;
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}
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if (szPassword != NULL)
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memcpy (szPassword, szTmp1, sizeof (szTmp1));
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if (szVerify != NULL)
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memcpy (szVerify, szTmp2, sizeof (szTmp2));
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burn (szTmp1, sizeof (szTmp1));
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burn (szTmp2, sizeof (szTmp2));
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EnableWindow (hButton, bEnable);
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}
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BOOL CheckPasswordCharEncoding (HWND hPassword, Password *ptrPw)
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{
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int i, len;
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if (hPassword == NULL)
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{
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unsigned char *pw;
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len = ptrPw->Length;
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pw = (unsigned char *) ptrPw->Text;
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for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
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{
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if (pw[i] >= 0x7f || pw[i] < 0x20) // A non-ASCII or non-printable character?
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return FALSE;
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}
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}
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else
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{
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wchar_t s[MAX_PASSWORD + 1];
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len = GetWindowTextLength (hPassword);
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if (len > MAX_PASSWORD)
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return FALSE;
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GetWindowTextW (hPassword, s, sizeof (s) / sizeof (wchar_t));
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for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
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{
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if (s[i] >= 0x7f || s[i] < 0x20) // A non-ASCII or non-printable character?
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break;
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}
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burn (s, sizeof(s));
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if (i < len)
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return FALSE;
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}
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return TRUE;
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}
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BOOL CheckPasswordLength (HWND hwndDlg, HWND hwndItem)
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{
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if (GetWindowTextLength (hwndItem) < PASSWORD_LEN_WARNING)
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{
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#ifndef _DEBUG
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if (MessageBoxW (hwndDlg, GetString ("PASSWORD_LENGTH_WARNING"), lpszTitle, MB_YESNO|MB_ICONWARNING|MB_DEFBUTTON2) != IDYES)
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return FALSE;
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#endif
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}
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return TRUE;
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}
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int ChangePwd (char *lpszVolume, Password *oldPassword, Password *newPassword, int pkcs5, HWND hwndDlg)
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{
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int nDosLinkCreated = 1, nStatus = ERR_OS_ERROR;
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char szDiskFile[TC_MAX_PATH], szCFDevice[TC_MAX_PATH];
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char szDosDevice[TC_MAX_PATH];
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char buffer[TC_VOLUME_HEADER_EFFECTIVE_SIZE];
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PCRYPTO_INFO cryptoInfo = NULL, ci = NULL;
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void *dev = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
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DWORD dwError;
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DWORD bytesRead;
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BOOL bDevice;
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unsigned __int64 hostSize = 0;
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int volumeType;
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int wipePass;
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FILETIME ftCreationTime;
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FILETIME ftLastWriteTime;
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FILETIME ftLastAccessTime;
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BOOL bTimeStampValid = FALSE;
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LARGE_INTEGER headerOffset;
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BOOL backupHeader;
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DISK_GEOMETRY driveInfo;
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if (oldPassword->Length == 0 || newPassword->Length == 0) return -1;
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WaitCursor ();
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CreateFullVolumePath (szDiskFile, lpszVolume, &bDevice);
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if (bDevice == FALSE)
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{
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strcpy (szCFDevice, szDiskFile);
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}
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else
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{
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nDosLinkCreated = FakeDosNameForDevice (szDiskFile, szDosDevice, szCFDevice, FALSE);
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if (nDosLinkCreated != 0)
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goto error;
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}
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dev = CreateFile (szCFDevice, GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, 0, NULL);
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if (dev == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
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goto error;
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if (bDevice)
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{
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/* This is necessary to determine the hidden volume header offset */
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if (dev == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
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{
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goto error;
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}
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else
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{
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PARTITION_INFORMATION diskInfo;
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DWORD dwResult;
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BOOL bResult;
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bResult = DeviceIoControl (dev, IOCTL_DISK_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY, NULL, 0,
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&driveInfo, sizeof (driveInfo), &dwResult, NULL);
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if (!bResult)
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goto error;
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bResult = GetPartitionInfo (lpszVolume, &diskInfo);
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if (bResult)
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{
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hostSize = diskInfo.PartitionLength.QuadPart;
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}
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else
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{
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hostSize = driveInfo.Cylinders.QuadPart * driveInfo.BytesPerSector *
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driveInfo.SectorsPerTrack * driveInfo.TracksPerCylinder;
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}
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if (hostSize == 0)
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{
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nStatus = ERR_VOL_SIZE_WRONG;
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goto error;
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}
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}
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}
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else
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{
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LARGE_INTEGER fileSize;
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if (!GetFileSizeEx (dev, &fileSize))
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{
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nStatus = ERR_OS_ERROR;
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goto error;
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}
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hostSize = fileSize.QuadPart;
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}
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if (Randinit ())
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goto error;
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if (!bDevice && bPreserveTimestamp)
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{
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if (GetFileTime ((HANDLE) dev, &ftCreationTime, &ftLastAccessTime, &ftLastWriteTime) == 0)
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bTimeStampValid = FALSE;
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else
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bTimeStampValid = TRUE;
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}
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for (volumeType = TC_VOLUME_TYPE_NORMAL; volumeType < TC_VOLUME_TYPE_COUNT; volumeType++)
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{
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// Seek the volume header
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switch (volumeType)
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{
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case TC_VOLUME_TYPE_NORMAL:
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headerOffset.QuadPart = TC_VOLUME_HEADER_OFFSET;
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break;
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case TC_VOLUME_TYPE_HIDDEN:
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if (TC_HIDDEN_VOLUME_HEADER_OFFSET + TC_VOLUME_HEADER_SIZE > hostSize)
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continue;
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headerOffset.QuadPart = TC_HIDDEN_VOLUME_HEADER_OFFSET;
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break;
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case TC_VOLUME_TYPE_HIDDEN_LEGACY:
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if (bDevice && driveInfo.BytesPerSector != TC_SECTOR_SIZE_LEGACY)
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continue;
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headerOffset.QuadPart = hostSize - TC_HIDDEN_VOLUME_HEADER_OFFSET_LEGACY;
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break;
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}
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if (!SetFilePointerEx ((HANDLE) dev, headerOffset, NULL, FILE_BEGIN))
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{
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nStatus = ERR_OS_ERROR;
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goto error;
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}
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/* Read in volume header */
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if (!ReadEffectiveVolumeHeader (bDevice, dev, buffer, &bytesRead))
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{
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nStatus = ERR_OS_ERROR;
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goto error;
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}
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if (bytesRead != sizeof (buffer))
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{
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// Windows may report EOF when reading sectors from the last cluster of a device formatted as NTFS
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memset (buffer, 0, sizeof (buffer));
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}
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/* Try to decrypt the header */
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nStatus = ReadVolumeHeader (FALSE, buffer, oldPassword, &cryptoInfo, NULL);
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if (nStatus == ERR_CIPHER_INIT_WEAK_KEY)
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nStatus = 0; // We can ignore this error here
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if (nStatus == ERR_PASSWORD_WRONG)
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{
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continue; // Try next volume type
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}
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else if (nStatus != 0)
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{
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cryptoInfo = NULL;
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goto error;
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}
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else
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break;
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}
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if (nStatus != 0)
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{
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cryptoInfo = NULL;
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goto error;
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}
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if (cryptoInfo->HeaderFlags & TC_HEADER_FLAG_ENCRYPTED_SYSTEM)
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{
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nStatus = ERR_SYS_HIDVOL_HEAD_REENC_MODE_WRONG;
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goto error;
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}
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// Change the PKCS-5 PRF if requested by user
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if (pkcs5 != 0)
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cryptoInfo->pkcs5 = pkcs5;
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RandSetHashFunction (cryptoInfo->pkcs5);
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NormalCursor();
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UserEnrichRandomPool (hwndDlg);
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EnableElevatedCursorChange (hwndDlg);
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WaitCursor();
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/* Re-encrypt the volume header */
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backupHeader = FALSE;
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while (TRUE)
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{
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/* The header will be re-encrypted PRAND_DISK_WIPE_PASSES times to prevent adversaries from using
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techniques such as magnetic force microscopy or magnetic force scanning tunnelling microscopy
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to recover the overwritten header. According to Peter Gutmann, data should be overwritten 22
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times (ideally, 35 times) using non-random patterns and pseudorandom data. However, as users might
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impatiently interupt the process (etc.) we will not use the Gutmann's patterns but will write the
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valid re-encrypted header, i.e. pseudorandom data, and there will be many more passes than Guttman
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recommends. During each pass we will write a valid working header. Each pass will use the same master
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key, and also the same header key, secondary key (XTS), etc., derived from the new password. The only
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item that will be different for each pass will be the salt. This is sufficient to cause each "version"
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of the header to differ substantially and in a random manner from the versions written during the
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other passes. */
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for (wipePass = 0; wipePass < PRAND_DISK_WIPE_PASSES; wipePass++)
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{
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// Prepare new volume header
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nStatus = CreateVolumeHeaderInMemory (FALSE,
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buffer,
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cryptoInfo->ea,
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cryptoInfo->mode,
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newPassword,
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cryptoInfo->pkcs5,
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cryptoInfo->master_keydata,
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&ci,
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cryptoInfo->VolumeSize.Value,
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(volumeType == TC_VOLUME_TYPE_HIDDEN || volumeType == TC_VOLUME_TYPE_HIDDEN_LEGACY) ? cryptoInfo->hiddenVolumeSize : 0,
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cryptoInfo->EncryptedAreaStart.Value,
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cryptoInfo->EncryptedAreaLength.Value,
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cryptoInfo->RequiredProgramVersion,
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cryptoInfo->HeaderFlags,
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cryptoInfo->SectorSize,
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wipePass < PRAND_DISK_WIPE_PASSES - 1);
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if (ci != NULL)
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crypto_close (ci);
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if (nStatus != 0)
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goto error;
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if (!SetFilePointerEx ((HANDLE) dev, headerOffset, NULL, FILE_BEGIN))
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{
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nStatus = ERR_OS_ERROR;
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goto error;
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}
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if (!WriteEffectiveVolumeHeader (bDevice, dev, buffer))
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{
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nStatus = ERR_OS_ERROR;
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goto error;
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}
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if (bDevice
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&& !cryptoInfo->LegacyVolume
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&& !cryptoInfo->hiddenVolume
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&& cryptoInfo->HeaderVersion == 4
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&& (cryptoInfo->HeaderFlags & TC_HEADER_FLAG_NONSYS_INPLACE_ENC) != 0
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&& (cryptoInfo->HeaderFlags & ~TC_HEADER_FLAG_NONSYS_INPLACE_ENC) == 0)
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{
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nStatus = WriteRandomDataToReservedHeaderAreas (dev, cryptoInfo, cryptoInfo->VolumeSize.Value, !backupHeader, backupHeader);
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if (nStatus != ERR_SUCCESS)
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goto error;
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}
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FlushFileBuffers (dev);
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}
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if (backupHeader || cryptoInfo->LegacyVolume)
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break;
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backupHeader = TRUE;
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headerOffset.QuadPart += hostSize - TC_VOLUME_HEADER_GROUP_SIZE;
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}
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/* Password successfully changed */
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nStatus = 0;
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error:
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dwError = GetLastError ();
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burn (buffer, sizeof (buffer));
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if (cryptoInfo != NULL)
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crypto_close (cryptoInfo);
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if (bTimeStampValid)
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SetFileTime (dev, &ftCreationTime, &ftLastAccessTime, &ftLastWriteTime);
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if (dev != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
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CloseHandle ((HANDLE) dev);
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if (nDosLinkCreated == 0)
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RemoveFakeDosName (szDiskFile, szDosDevice);
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RandStop (FALSE);
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NormalCursor ();
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SetLastError (dwError);
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if (nStatus == ERR_OS_ERROR && dwError == ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED
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&& bDevice
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&& !UacElevated
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&& IsUacSupported ())
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return nStatus;
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if (nStatus != 0)
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handleError (hwndDlg, nStatus);
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return nStatus;
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}
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user