diff --git a/doc/chm/VeraCrypt User Guide.chm b/doc/chm/VeraCrypt User Guide.chm index 870f5914..f2f1c5ce 100644 Binary files a/doc/chm/VeraCrypt User Guide.chm and b/doc/chm/VeraCrypt User Guide.chm differ diff --git a/doc/html/System Encryption.html b/doc/html/System Encryption.html index 676c2e19..ed92c717 100644 --- a/doc/html/System Encryption.html +++ b/doc/html/System Encryption.html @@ -65,7 +65,8 @@ Because of BIOS requirement, the pre-boot password is typed using US key During the system encryption process, VeraCrypt automatically and transparently switches the keyboard to US layout in order to ensure that the password value typed will match the one typed in pre-boot mode. Thus, in order to avoid wrong password errors, one must type the password using the same keys as when creating the system encryption.

Note: By default, Windows 7 and later boot from a special small partition. The partition contains files that are required to boot the system. Windows allows only applications that have administrator privileges to write to the partition (when the system is - running). VeraCrypt encrypts the partition only if you choose to encrypt the whole system drive (as opposed to choosing to encrypt only the partition where Windows is installed).

+ running). In EFI boot mode, which is the default on modern PCs, VeraCrypt can not encrypt this partition since it must remain unencrypted so that the BIOS can load the EFI bootloader from it. This in turn implies that in EFI boot mode, VeraCrypt offers only to encrypt the system partition where Windows is installed (the user can later manualy encrypt other data partitions using VeraCrypt). + In MBR legacy boot mode, VeraCrypt encrypts the partition only if you choose to encrypt the whole system drive (as opposed to choosing to encrypt only the partition where Windows is installed).

 

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diff --git a/doc/html/Unencrypted Data in RAM.html b/doc/html/Unencrypted Data in RAM.html index 8917867a..74651c0c 100644 --- a/doc/html/Unencrypted Data in RAM.html +++ b/doc/html/Unencrypted Data in RAM.html @@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ Inherently, unencrypted master keys have to be stored in RAM too. When a non-sys cleanly restarted), or when the system crashes, VeraCrypt naturally stops running and therefore cannot erase any keys or any other sensitive data. Furthermore, as Microsoft does not provide any appropriate API for handling hibernation and shutdown, master keys used for system encryption cannot be reliably (and are not) erased from RAM when the computer hibernates, is shut down or restarted.** +
+Starting from version 1.24, VeraCrypt introduces a mechanism to encrypt master keys and cached passwords in RAM. This RAM encryption mechanism must be activated manually in "Performance/Driver Configuration" dialog. RAM encryption comes with a performance overhead (between 5% and 15% depending on the CPU speed) and it disables Windows hibernate.
+Moreover, VeraCrypt 1.24 and above provide an additional security mechanism when system encryption is used that makes VeraCrypt erase master keys from RAM when a new device is connected to the PC. This additional mechanism can be activated using an option in System Settings dialog.
+Even though both above mechanisms provides strong protection for masterskeys and cached password, users should still take usual precautions related for the safery of sensitive data in RAM.